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Solving imperfect-information games via
exponential counterfactual regret minimization
Huale Li, Xuan Wang, Shuhan Qi, Jiajia Zhang, Yang Liu, Fengwei Jia
Abstract—Two agents’ decision-making problems can be modeled as the game with two players, and a Nash equilibrium is the basic
solution conception representing good play in games. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a popular method to solve Nash
equilibrium strategy in two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information. The CFR and its variants have successfully addressed
many problems in this field. However, the convergence of the CFR methods is not fast, since they solve the strategy by iterative
computing. To some extent, this further affects the solution performance. In this paper, we propose a novel CFR based method,
exponential counterfactual regret minimization, which also can be called as ECFR. Firstly, we present an exponential reduction
technique for regret in the process of the iteration. Secondly, we prove that our method ECFR has a good theoretical guarantee of
convergence. Finally, we show that, ECFR can converge faster compared with the prior state-of-the-art CFR based methods in the
experiment.
Index Terms—Decision-making, Counterfactual regret minimization, Nash equilibrium, zero-sum games, imperfect information.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
GAME theory has always been regarded as a touchstoneto verify the theory of computation and artificial in-
telligence, and it is also a very attractive research field of
artificial intelligence. Generally, the game can be divided
into perfect information game (PIG) and imperfect infor-
mation game (IIG), according to whether the player can
observe the game state completely. The PIG means that the
player can observe the game state completely, such as Go
and Chess. On the contrary, the IIG contains some private
information, thus the player cannot completely observe the
game state, such as poker. The IIG attracts more and more
researchers’ attention, since the IIG is closer to the real life
and more challenging compared with the PIG. In this paper,
we mainly focus on the problem of decision-making in the
field of the IIG.
In recent years, reinforcement learning has made great
success in many fields, whether in the field of the PIG or
the IIG [1], [2]. DeepMind team’s pioneering agent, which
combines reinforcement learning [3] with deep learning,
has achieved excellent performance in Atari games [1]. In
addition, AlphaGo [2] and AlphaStar [4] based on deep
reinforcement learning (DRL), as well as the agents they
developed in recent years, have made great achievements
[3]. Although the DRL based method has been successful in
many fields, the strategy based on the DRL lacks enough
theoretical guarantee, which limits the further application
of the DRL methods [3]. Therefore, the strategy solving
method based on the game theory has attracted researchers’
attention. Since its good theoretical guarantee, counterfac-
tual regret minimization (CFR) becomes a classical method
to solve the game strategy with imperfect information [5] in
two-player zero-sum games.
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The CFR has many variants in recent years, which also
attracts the attention of more and more researchers [5].
Monte Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is
a sampling CFR-based method, which applies Monte Carlo
technique to the vanilla CFR [6]. CFR+ is the main method of
the Cepheus, the first computer program which solved the
heads-up limit Texas hold’em poker efficiently [7]. Double
neural CFR [8] and Deep CFR [9] combine the deep neural
network with the vanilla CFR and the linear CFR (LCFR)
respectively. In addition, single deep CFR (SDCFR) [10] is
a simplified variant of the Deep CFR, which only uses one
neural network to approximate the value in the LCFR. More-
over, public chance sampling in CFR (PCCFR) [11], variance
reduction in MCCFR (VR-MCCFR) [12] and discount CFR
(DCFR) [13] are all variants of the vanilla CFR.
The CFR based methods have achieved a great success
in the field of the IIG, especially in poker games. Libratus
is the first agent based on the CFR method, which beat
the professional human player in heads-up no-limit Texas
Hold’em poker [14]. DeepStack defeated the professional
poker player and its method is sound with theoretical proof
[15]. Pluribus, the latest computer program based on the
related CFR method, defeated the top poker player in six-
player no-limit Texas Hold’em poker, which is recognized as
the milestone in the field of artificial intelligence and game
theory [16]. However, these successful applications are all
aimed at specific areas using some specific settings to solve
the strategy combined with the CFR, and do not improve
the vanilla CFR. Due to the vanilla CFR is an iterative
strategy solving method, with the increase of the number of
iterations, the strategy obtained is more and more accurate.
Therefore, it is worth studying how to get an acceptable
strategy through less iterations. In other words, we need
to explore how to accelerate the convergence of the CFR
method.
Thus, this paper aims to the study of speeding up the
convergence of the vanilla CFR. In this paper, we firstly
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Fig. 1. The game tree of the game Coin Toss. (”C” represents a chance
node. P1 and P2 are game players. A coin is flipped and lands either
Head or Tail with equal probability, but only player P1 can see the
outcome. The information set of P2 is the dotted line between the two
P2 nodes, which means the player P2 cannot distinguish between the
two states.)
present an exponential reduction technique that applies to
the vanilla CFR, which we call this new variant exponential
CFR (ECFR). Secondly, we give a theoretical proof of the
ECFR, which shows that our method ECFR has a good
theoretical guarantee the same as the vanilla CFR. Finally,
four kinds of games (Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Royal poker,
Liar’s Dice) are used to test the ECFR. Kuhn poker and
Leduc poker are classic test platforms in the field of the
IIG. Extensive experimental results show that the ECFR
converges faster in the four kinds of games compared with
the state-of-the-art CFR based methods in recent years.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.
In Sect.2 we introduce the concepts of the extensive form
game and describe the Nash equilibrium and the CFR. Our
method is described in Sect.3, which includs the ECFR and
its convergence proof. In Sect.4, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the ECFR on four kinds of games. Finally, in Sect.5,
we make a conclusion of the whole paper.
2 NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the notations and definitions of the extensive-
form game are introduced firstly. Secondly, the concept of
Nash equilibrium is described. Finally, the overview of the
CFR is described.
2.1 Extensive-form game
Normal-form game and extensive-form game are two clas-
sical model, which are used to model related problems of
the game in the IIG. Generally, the extensive-form game is
a widely used model to study the complex game with large
scales. The game tree can be used to represent the extensive-
form game in the field of the IIG, which is the same as that
in the PIG (such as Go, Chess). The Fig. 1 is a game tree of
the game, Coin Toss.
In the game tree, each node represents a game state. A
leaf node, which is known as the terminal node, indicates
that the game has ended. Meanwhile, the corresponding
payoff is returned after the game ends. In addition, the edge
between two nodes represents the action or the decision
TABLE 1
The description of the variable
Variable The meaning
u the utility function, and ui represents the utility of the
player i
H a limited set of sequences, which is the possible
historical actions
σ the strategy, and σi the strategy of the player i, σ−i is
the strategy of the player except the player i
Ii the information set of the player i
piσ(h) the joint probability of reaching h if all players play
according to σ, piσi (h) is the probability of reaching h
if the player i play according to σ
taken by the game player in the turn. Remarkably, the
information set is a unique concept in the field of the IIG,
which represents a game player cannot distinguish between
two states in the same information set. As shown in the
Fig. 1, the player P1 can choose between actions Left and
Right, with the action Left leading to obtain the payoff
directly. If the action Right is selected by the player P1, then
the P2 has the opportunity to guess how the coin landed. If
the P2 guesses correctly, the P1 will receive a reward of -1
and the P2 will receive a reward of 1 [17].
Generally, a finite extensive-form game with imperfect
information has six components < N,H,P, fc, I, u > : N
is game player. H is a limited set of sequences, which
is the possible historical actions. P is the player function.
P (h) = c means that the chance determines the action a
after the history h. fc is a function that associates with every
history h for which P (h) = c is a probability measures
fc(· | h) on A(h) ( fc(a | h) is the probability that a
occurs given h). I is the information set where the player
cannot distinguish the state. u is an utility function for every
termination state. Due to there are many symbols in the
paper, especially in this part. Thus we give a brief list of
variables for further reading in the Table 1.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is an important theory in game theory,
which lays a theoretical foundation for many studies. Nash
equilibrium is usually used to solve the strategy of the two-
player extensive-form game in the field of the IIG, which can
be also called non-cooperative game equilibrium (NE) [18].
To better understand Nash equilibrium, we first introduce
the concept of the strategy in the following.
The strategy σ is a probability vector over actions in the
extensive-form game, and σi is the strategy of the player
i. σi(I, a) represents the probability of the action a of the
player i in the information set I . σ−i refers to all the
strategies in σ except the player i’s strategy σi. piσ(h) can
be the probability of the history h that occurs, only if the
game player takes the legal action according to the strategy
σ. ui (σi, σ−i) is the expected patoff for the player i if all
players play according to the strategy profile (σi, σ−i).
A best response to σ−i is a player i’s strategy BR(σ−i)
such that ui (BR (σ−i) , σ−i) = maxσ′i ui (σ
′
i, σ−i). A Nash
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equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile where everyone plays a
best response: ∀i, ui
(
σ∗i , σ
∗
−i
)
= maxσ′i ui
(
σ′i, σ
∗
−i
)
[18].
2.3 Counterfactual regret minimization
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a popular
method to solve the Nash equilibrium strategy in two-
player zero-sum games with imperfect information [5]. We
provide an overview of the vanilla CFR in the following.
Let σt be the strategy on the iteration t. The instan-
taneous regret rt(I, a) on the iteration t is rt(I, a) =
vσ
t
(I, a) − vσt(I) and the regret on the iteration T
is RT (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 r
T (I, a). Here, vσ(I) is defined
as vσ(I) =
∑
h∈I
(
piσ−i(h | I)vσi (h)
)
, and vσ(I, a) =∑
h∈I
(
piσ−i(h | I)vσi (h · a)
)
where piσ−i
(
h|I
)
=
piσ−i(h)
piσ−i(I)
. Gen-
erally, RT+(I, a) = max
{
RT (I, a), 0
}
. The CFR updates its
strategy iteratively through the regret matching algorithm
(RM) on each information set. In the RM, a player picks a
distribution over actions in an information set in proportion
to the positive regret on those actions. Formally, on the
iteration t+ 1, the player selects actions a ∈ A(I) according
to probabilities:
σT+1(I, a) =
{
RT+(I,a)∑
a′∈A(I) R
T
+(I,a
′) , if
∑
a′ R
T
+ (I, a
′) > 0
1
|A(I)| , otherwise
(1)
3 OUR METHOD
In this section, firstly, the exponential reduction technique
is presented in Sect. 3.1. Secondly, the process of the ECFR
is introduced in Sect. 3.2. Thirdly, the proof of the ECFR is
discussed in Sect. 3.3. Finally, the difference to other CFR
based methods will be disscussed.
3.1 Exponential reduction technique
In current years, there are many improved methods based
on the vanilla CFR. Discount CFR (DCFR) [13], Linear CFR
(LCFR) [9] and dynamic thresholding for the CFR [19] are
aiming at the study of speeding up the convergence of the
vanilla CFR.
Among these methods, LCFR and DCFR are mainly to
balance the weight of regret value generated in the early it-
eration and the later iteration. In [19], it introduces dynamic
thresholding for the CFR, in which a threshold is set at every
iteration such that any action with probability below the
threshold is set to zero probability. In addition, the essence
of the CFR is an iterative strategy solution method, and the
strategy can become more and more accurate with the in-
crease of iterations. Thus, intuitively, we need to balance the
weight of regret value and the iteration. However, whether
the vanilla CFR or several improved methods for balancing
weights, the ultimate goal is to accelerate the iteration speed
of the CFR, that is, to improve the convergence speed
of the solution strategy. Based on this idea, we propose
an exponential reduction technique, which can make the
strategy converge faster.
We first analyze several improvement methods in recent
years. As LCFR [9] and DCFR [13], their improvements to
the vanilla CFR are mainly reflected in the weighting of the
regret value. The LCFR weights the regret value, which is
the same as the number of iterations. The DCFR also weights
regret values, but this weight is respectively for positive and
negative regret values, which are (t/(t+1))α and (t/(t+1))β
(t is the number of the iteration). In other words, the weights
of the regret values in these methods are different. However,
they all give a certain weight to the regret value, so that the
importance of the regret value does not change much with
the number of iterations in the same situation.
Through the above analysis, we propose an exponential
reduction technique. The core of this technique is exponen-
tial weight. Its formally description is as follows:
f(x) =
{
eα ∗ x, if x > 0
eα ∗ β, if x ≤ 0 (2)
where α is a parameter corresponding with the variable x,
β is a parameter with small value, and f(x) is the output
through the exponential reduction.
Besides, given the variable x, specifically in the CFR,
there is a negative value in this variable x. The previous
processing is to set the negative value to 0, no matter what
the weight is, the final processed value is zero. However, for
the exponential weight, when the negative value is set to 0,
we give the variable a new minimum value eα ∗ β, which
makes the final result not zero.
3.2 Exponential Counterfactual Regret Minimization
We propose a novel CFR-based variant, exponential Coun-
terfactual Regret Minimization, which can be also called
ECFR, in this section. Our method ECFR is based on the
vanilla CFR, which redistributes the weight of instant regret
value through the exponential reduction technique intro-
duced before.
As depicted before, the parameter α in the exponential
reduction technique is corresponding with the variable x.
Specifically in the ECFR, we firstly redefine a loss fuction,
which needs to be closely related to the instant regret value
in each iteration (we regard the instant regret value on each
iteration as the variable). We call it L1 loss, which is more
suitable for the CFR. It can be defined as follows:
L1 = r
i
(I,a) − EVI (3)
where ri(I,a) has the same definition in the vanilla CFR
that is the immediate counterfactual regret. EVI is the
average counterfactual regret value on each iteration,EVI =
1
|AI |
∑
a∈AI r(I, a), AI is the legal actions on the informa-
tion set I .
The vanilla CFR decomposes the total regret value into
the regret value above each information set. Our approach
still uses this feature for every action on each information
set at every iteration. Different from the vanilla CFR, our
method ECFR uses a certain weight for the calculation of
the immediate regret value. ECFR balances the importance
of immediate regret values by introducing L1 loss and
weighting in exponential form, with the iteration increasing.
The regret for all action a ∈ A(I) on each information set I ,
RTi (I, a) can be depicted as follows:
RTi,ECFR(I, a) =
{ ∑T
t=1 e
L1rti(I, a), if r
t
i(I, a) > 0∑T
t=1 e
L1β, if rti(I, a) ≤ 0
(4)
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where β is a parameter that will be set in the following.
Then the strategy of next iteration strategy for T + 1
iterations, which can be computed with regret matching
algorithm (RM) is depicted as follows:
σT+1i (I, a) =
eL1RTi,ECFR(I, a)∑
a′∈A(I) eL1R
T
i,ECFR (I, a
′)
(5)
In the vanilla CFR, the regret RTi ≤
∑
I∈Ii R
T (I) if the
player i plays according to the CFR on each iteration. Thus,
as T → ∞, RTiT → 0 [5]. If both players’ average regret
satisfies R
T
i
T ≤ , then their average strategies
〈
σ¯T1 , σ¯
T
2
〉
will
be a 2-Nash equilibrium in the two-player zero-sum game
[20], where the average strategy σ¯Ti (I) =
∑T
t=1
(
piσ
t
i (I)σ
t
i(I)
)
∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)
.
For regret matching in the CFR [5], it proves that if∑∞
t=1 wt = ∞ then the weighted average regret, which is
defined as Rw,Ti = maxa∈A
∑T
t=1(wtr
t(a))∑T
t=1 w
t is bounded by:
Rw,Ti ≤
∆
√|A|√∑Tt=1 w2t∑T
t=1 wt
(6)
The work of [21] has shown that the weighted average
strategy σw,Ti (I) =
∑
t∈T
(
wtpi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I)
)
∑
t∈T (wtpiσ
t
i (I))
is a 2-Nash equi-
librium if the weighted average regret is  in two-player
zero-sum games. The same conclusion can be applied to our
method ECFR, the average strategy of players computed
with ECFR will eventually converge to Nash equilibrium,
and the average strategy of the ECFR is as follows:
σ¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 e
L1piσ
t
i (I)σ
t(I, a)∑T
t=1 e
L1piσ
t
i (I)
(7)
the detailed proof of the ECFR will be introduced in the next
section. The ECFR algorithm is depicted in the algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The ECFR algorithm
Input: The game G, the strategy σt, the regret vi(σ, I)
and Rti(I, a), β
Output: The strategy σt+1 of next iteration, the average
strategy σ¯Ti (I, a).
1: for Iteration t = 1→ T do
2: Initilize the strategy σt, regret ui(σ, I) and Rti(I, a)
3: for Player i = 1, 2 do
4: vi(σ, I) =
∑
h∈I,h′∈Z pi
σ
−i(h)pi
σ(h,h′)ui(h′)
piσ−i(I)
5: ri(I,a) = vi (σ
t
I→a, I)− vi (σt, I)
6: RTi,ECFR(I, a) =
{ ∑T
t=1 e
L1rti(I, a), r
t
i > 0∑T
t=1 e
L1β, rti ≤ 0
7: σT+1i (I, a) =
eL1RTi,ECFR(I,a)∑
a′∈A(I) e
L1RTi,ECFR(I,a
′)
8: σ¯Ti (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 e
L1piσ
t
i (I)σ
t(I,a)∑T
t=1 e
L1piσti (I)
9: end for
10: end for
11: return σt+1i (I, a), σ¯
T
i (I, a)
3.3 Theoretical guarantee of convergence for the ECFR
A brief but sufficient theoretical proof of convergence for the
ECFR is given in this section. As described in the previous
section, our method ECFR also use the regret matching
algorithm as the core algorithm. We give the bigger argu-
ment to weight the regret. Thus, we will give a proof that
there is a bound for the sequence of weights, when the
average strategy is calculated. Meanwhile, the bound on the
convergence can be never lower compared with the vanilla
CFR. Theorem 1 shows the convergence bound of the ECFR
in the two-player zero-sum game.
Theorem 1 Assume that the number of the iteration
T of the ECFR, which is played in a two-player zero-
sum game. Then the weighted average strategy profile is
a
∆|I|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
-Nash equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the following, which combines
the the proof for the vanilla CFR [5], CFR+ [7], [22] and the
discount CFR [13].
Proof. The lowest amount of the instant regret on any
iteration is −∆. Consider the weighted sequence of iter-
ations σ′1, . . . , σ′T , where σ′t is identical to σt, but the
weight is wa,t =
∏T−1
i=t e
i = e
(T+t−1)(T−t)
2 rather than
wa,t =
∏T−1
i=t e
L1 . R′t(I, a) is the regret of the action a on
the information set I at the iteration t, for this new sequence.
In addition, for the regret matching [23], which proves
that if
∑∞
t=1 wt =∞, then the weighted average regret that
defined as Rw,Ti = maxa∈A
∑T
t=1(wtr
t(a))∑T
t=1 w
t can be bounded
by the Eq.6 depicted in the section 3.2.
We can find that Rt(I, a) ≤ ∆
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
for the player
i’ action a on the information set I , from the lemma 3.
We can use the Lemma 1, which uses the weight wα,t for
the iteration t with B =
∆
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
and C = 0. It
means that R′t(I, a) ≤ wT (B − C) ≤ ∆
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
from
the Lemma 1. Furthermore, we get the weighted average
regret is at most
∆|Ii|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
from the Lemma 3. Since
for the information set, |I1| + |I2| = |I|, thus the weighted
average strageties form a
∆|I|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
-Nash equilibrium
(With the iteration T increasing,
∆|I|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
is infinitely
close to zero).
Lemma 1. Call a sequence x1, . . . , xT of bounded real
values BC-plausible if B > 0, C ≤ 0,∑it=1 xt ≥ C for all i,
and
∑T
t=1 xt ≤ B. For any BC -plausible sequence and any
sequence of non-decreasing weights wt ≥ 0,
∑T
t=1 (wtxt) ≤
wT (B − C).
Lemma 2. Given a group of actions A and any sequence
of rewards vt, such that |vt(a)− vt(b)| ≤ ∆ for all t and
all a, b ∈ A, after conducting a set of strategies decided by
the regret matching, however applying the regret-like value
Qt(a) instead of Rt(a), QT (a) ≤ ∆√|A|T for all a ∈ A.
Proof. This Lemma is closely resembling Lemma 1, which
are both from [22], thus here we donot give the detailed
proof of these two lemmas.
Lemma 3. Suppose the player i conducts T iterations of
the ECFR, then the weighted regret for the player i is at
most ∆ |Ii|
√|A|√T , and the weighted average regret for
the player i is at most
∆|Ii|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
.
Proof. The weight of the iteration t < T iswt =
∏T−1
i=t e
L1
and wT = 1. Therefore, for all iteration t,
∑T
t=1 w
2
t ≤ Te4T
2
.
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In addition,
∑T
t=1 wt ≥ Te
T (T+1)
2 ≥ TeT 2 .
Through the Eq.6 and the Lemma 2, we can find
that Qw,Ti ≤
∆
√
|A|
√∑T
t=1 w
2
t∑T
t=1 wt
≤ ∆
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
. Due to
RTi ≤
∑
I∈Ii R
T (I) [23], we can find that Qw,Ti ≤
∆|Ii|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
. Since Rw,Ti ≤ Qw,Ti , thus Rw,Ti ≤
∆|Ii|
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
.
3.4 Difference from Other CFR based methods
In this section we mainly analyze the difference between our
method ECFR and other three major CFR based methods,
LCFR [9], DCFR [9] and dynamic thresholding for the CFR
[19] (we call this method dynamic CFR for short). Because
these methods all the study of speeding up the convergence
of the vanilla CFR.
The LCFR and the DCFR both improve the CFR through
a certain weight. The DCFR is completed by discounting the
immediate regret value obtained in each iteration. For the
positive immediate regret value, multiplied by the weight
of t
α
tα+1 , and for the negative immediate regret value, mul-
tiplied by the weight of t
β
tβ+1
. In addition, for the average
strategy, the vanilla CFR directly uses the average strategy
as the final strategy. In the DCFR, the average strategy
is multiplied by
(
t
t+1
)γ
as the final strategy. After the
above three forms of discount, the regret value of each
iteration and the final strategy are realized by the weight
reallocated. The LCFR uses the iteration corresponding with
the immediate regret value. That is to say, the iteration is
weighted to the regret value in every iterations with the
number of the iteration increasing. In the dynamic CFR, it
speeds up the convergence by pruning parts of decision tree
with dynamic thresholding.
Although the ECFR also reweights the regret value in
each iteration, it is quite different from the DCFR and the
LCFR both in the original idea and the implementation.
First of all, our approach comes from an intuitive idea. No
matter which method is improved based on the vanilla CFR,
the ultimate goal is to further accelerate the convergence of
the strategy by reweighting the regret value. In the iterative
method, when the number of iterations increases and the
strategy becomes better, the importance of the same level
of the immediate regret is totally different. Secondly, in
terms of implementation details, our method reallocates the
weight through the exponential form of the redefined L1
loss, and the DCFR is realized by some discount on the
number of iterations. Therefore, this is a totally different
approach.
In the dynamic CFR, the exponential weight is used in
computing the next iteration strategy when using Hedge
to minimize regret. However, our approach ECFR is quite
different from the dynamic CFR in six aspects. Firstly, our
approach uses exponential decay to calculate cumulative
regret and the next iteration strategy, while the dynamic
CFR only uses exponential weight in computing the next
iteration strategy. Secondly, our approach gives a small
value to the negative immediate regret. Because we think
that the actions corresponding to the negative regret in the
early stage are also valuable. While the dynamic only deals
with the positive regret. Thirdly, the exponential weight is
only used in the dynamic CFR when using the Hedge as the
algorithm to minimize the regret. While our approach uses
regret matching algorithm as regret minimization method
for the strategy iteration. Fourthly, the dynamic CFR does
not traverse all nodes in the game tree, but prunes the
nodes below the threshold to accelerate the convergence.
While our approach traverses all nodes in the game tree,
and accelerates convergence by redistributing the weight of
regret. Fifthly, the parameter setting for exponential weight
of the two methods are different.
√
ln(|A(I)|)
3
√
VAR(I)t
√
t
is set in the
dynamic CFR (VAR(I)t is the observed variance of v(I) up
to the iteration t), while in our approach the L1 is set (L1 =
ri(I,a)−EVI ). Finally, from the theoretical analysis, the regret
bound of the two methods are different. The regret bound
of the dynamic CFR is RT (I) ≤ C√2∆(I)√ln(|A(I)|)√T
(C ≥ 1 on every iteration t), while the regret bound in our
method is RT (I) ≤ ∆
√
|A|e2T−T2√
T
.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Experiment Setup
Due to the game of the poker has all elements of the IIG,
it has been used to test the performance of CFR based
methods by researchers in recent years. Therefore, we test
and compare the ECFR with other CFR based methods on
three different poker games. The three kinds of poker are
Kuhn, Leduc and Royal, which are all simple versions of
Texas hold’em poker. Compared with Texas hold’em poker,
although the number of game states and actions is smaller,
they still have all the characteristics of the IIG. We choose
them as the test platform, mainly because they are small
enough to evaluate the performance of the algorithm.
It should be pointed out that the three kinds of poker we
used in the experiment are about two-player games. Among
these three kinds of poker, Kuhn poker is the simplest. Kuhn
poker has three cards in total, only one round, each player
has one hand, and no public cards. Leduc poker has six
cards in two rounds. Each player has a private hand in the
first round and a public card in the second round. There are
eight cards in the Royal poker game, and there will be three
rounds. In the first round, each player gets a private card,
and a public card is issued in the second round and the third
round respectively. The table Tab. 2 gives some descriptions
of three types of poker.
In addition, in order to further verify the effectiveness of
our method, we also test it on the game of Liar’s Dice. The
Liar’s Dice is different from poker game, but it still belongs
to the field of the IIG. Five dices are used for each player
with dice cups used for concealment. In the each round, each
player can roll a ”hand” of dice under their cup and look at
their hand while keeping it concealed from other players.
The first player begins bidding, which announces any face
value and the number of dice that the player believes are
showing that value under all of the cups in the game. Each
player has two choices during their turn: make a higher bid
or challenge the previous bid (typically with a call of ”liar”).
Raising the bid means either increasing the quantity, or the
face value, or both, according to the specific bidding rules
used. More details can refer to Wikipedia.
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TABLE 2
The details of three kinds of poker
Poker Total cards Public cards Private cards Round Ante Betsize
Kuhn 3 0 1 1 1 1
Leduc 6 1 1 2 1 2; 4
Royal 8 2 1 3 1 2; 4; 4
4.2 Experimental Results
A natural and standard evaluation metric is measuring
the exploitability of the strategy solved by the algorithm
in recent years. The strategy is better when the strategy’s
exploitability is lower. When the exploitability is zero, it
means that this strategy cannot be beat by any strategy.
Two groups experiments are conducted in the paper.
The first group experiments is to verify the effectiveness
of the method on four different games. The second group
experiments is the ablation study, which mainly analyzes
the parameter setting.
4.2.1 Compared with state-of-the-art methods
We conduct the first group experiments with three state-of-
the-art methods of recent years, which are CFR [5], LCFR
[9], and DCFR [13] respectively. It is found that after the
number of iterations 10000, the reduction of exploitability
has been very small. Thus, we only carried out 10000 iter-
ations, which is enough to show the effectiveness of each
method. The experimental results are shown in the Fig. 2.
Note that figures in the left column are the overall curve of
the experimental results and figures in the right column are
a further detailed display of the figures in the left column.
As shown in the Fig. 2, four methods are totally used in
the experiment. The CFR [5], LCFR [9], and DCFR [13] are
used to compare with our approach ECFR. The CFR [5] is the
first method to solve the strategy through regret matching
in the IIG. The LCFR and the DCFR are both CFR based
methods, which discount regrets from iterations in various
ways. Among them, we choose the parameters α = 1.5, β =
0, and γ = 2 in the DCFR, which is an optimal parameter
given in the [13].
Firstly, we analyze the convergence of our approach. In
the Fig. 2 (especially the figure on the left), we can find
that the red solid line (stands for our approach ECFR) all
ends up close to zero in four test games. In addition, from
the overall trend of the curve, we can also find that with
the increase of the number of iterations, the ECFR shows a
similar trend with the other three methods. That is, the curve
presents a downward trend. Moreover, the convergence of
the ECFR has been proved theoretically before in the Sec.3.3.
Therefore, our approach has a good convergence, which
has been verified from both experimental and theoretical
perspectives.
Fig. 2a shows the experimental results on the Kuhn
poker. It can be found that the ECFR performs better than
the other methods on the whole, although the LCFR per-
forms better than the ECFR in partial iterations, such as
t = 82 ∼ 88, 114 ∼ 120, 182 ∼ 185, 241 ∼ 248. In addition,
the LCFR is very unstable and fluctuates a lot. In contrast,
our approach performs better than other methods in most
iterations, and the performance is relatively stable.
Fig. 2b shows the experimental results on the Leduc
poker. We can find that our approach is not always better
than other methods. It can be found that although in the
iteration t = 73 ∼ 76, 118 ∼ 122, the exploitability of
the ECFR (the red curve) is slightly slower than that of
the DCFR and the LCFR. But in addition to these limited
number of iterations, our method always shows superiority
over all other methods.
Fig. 2c shows the experimental results on the Royal
poker. It can be seen clearly from the figure that the per-
formance of our method performs better than that of other
comparison methods. The red curve is always at the bottom
compared with other curves.
Fig. 2d shows the experimental results on the Liar’s Dice.
In this paper, only two-player Liar’s Dice is used to test
the method. Because these methods are aiming at solving
the Nash equilibrium strategy, which is only proved to be
effective in the two-player games. Although the advantage
of our approach is not obvious, we can still find that our
method is superior to other comparison methods, except in
a few iterations.
To sum up, four games are used to test the effectiveness
of our method. In terms of the convergence, experimental
results show that our method has a good convergence.
In terms of the convergence rate, the experimental results
show that our method can speed up the convergence of the
strategy, which shows a better performance than other com-
parison methods. The results fully verifies the effectiveness
of our method ECFR.
4.2.2 Ablation study
The second group experiments is conducted to study
the different parameter settings. For the setting of β in
the ECFR in Eq.4, several different settings are tested.
Specifically, we have made four different settings for
β: ±1,±0.1,±0.01,±0.001,±0.0001,±0.00001; r, r2, r3;
± 1t ,± 1t2 ,± 1t3 ; tr, tr2, tr3. r is the instant regret for each
action and t is the number of iteration. The results are
shown in the Fig. 3a. We start with a rough selection
of four different sets of values and then make a further
fine selection. For the further fine selection, the β is set to:
−0.008,−0.009,−0.0001,−0.00011,−0.00012,−r2,− r2t ,− r
2
t2 ,
and the results are shown in the Fig. 3b. Considering that
we only choose the optimal parameter settings here, two
games (Kuhn and Leduc) are used to test the setting. The
iteration is set to 1000.
As shown in the Fig. 3a, we can find that β = −0.0001,
β = −r2, β = −0.00001, and β = r3 have a good perfor-
mance in the Kuhn poker game. In the Leduc poker game,
β = −0.0001 and β = −r2 have a good performance, but
β = −0.00001 and β = r3 perform worse than β = −0.0001
and β = −r2.
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Fig. 2. Compared with the prior state-of-the-art methods. (The Y-axis represents the exploitability, and the X-axis represents the number of iterations.
The smaller of the exploitability, the better. The subfigures in the left column are the overall curve of the experimental results. The subfigures in the
right column are a further detailed display of the subfigures in the left column, in order to better display the experimental results.)
On the whole, β = −0.0001 and β = −r2 are chosen
for further optimization. In order to further select the ap-
propriate β, we set them more finely. For β = −0.0001,
−0.008,−0.009,−0.00011,−0.00012 are added for compar-
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Fig. 3. Ablation study on the parameter settings. (The Y-axis represents the exploitability, and the X-axis represents the number of iterations. The
smaller of the exploitability, the better. For parameter setting, we also conducted two groups of experiments. First, we selected a group of optimal
settings from several groups of parameters, and then refined the selected optimal values before.)
ison. For β = −r2, − r2t and − r
2
t2 are added for comparison.
The results are shown in the Fig. 3b.
In the Kuhn poker game, we can find that β =
−r2 performs the best compared with other settings in
the Fig. 3b. In the Leduc poker game, although β =
−0.0001, 0.00011, 0.00012 perform better in the first 400
iterations, the performance of β = −r2 gradually exceeds
others after 400 iterations. Therefore, β = −r2 is selected as
the final setting in the comparison experiments.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a new variant of the vanilla
CFR, ECFR, which is used to solve the approximate Nash
equilibria strategy of extensive-form games in the imperfect
information game. We introduce the exponential reduction
technique for regret in the process of the iteration. Moreover,
we give the theoretical guarantee of our method. Extenxive
experiments are conducted on four kinds of games. The
experimental results show that our method not only has a
good convergence, but also converges faster compared with
state-of-the-art methods.
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